Several explanations for the observed limited stock market participation have been offered in the literature. One of the most promising is the presence of market frictions mostly in the form of fixed entry and/or transaction costs. Empirical studies point to a significant structural (state) dependence in the the stock market entry decision, which is consistent with costs of this type. However, the magnitude of these costs is not yet known. This paper focuses on fixed stock market entry costs. I set up a structural estimation procedure which involves solving and simulating a life cycle intertemporal portfolio choice model augmented with a fixed stock market entry cost. Important features of household portfolio data (from the PSID) are matched to their simulated counterparts. Utilizing a Simulated Minimum Distance estimator, I estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the discount factor and the stock market entry cost. Given the equity premium and the calibrated income process, I estimate a one-time entry cost of approximately 2 percent of the permanent component of the annual labor income. My estimated model matches the zero median holding as well as the hump-shaped age-participation profile observed in the data.
Introduction
Recent empirical evidence suggests that, in any developed country, about fifty percent of households do not hold equities directly or indirectly (through mutual funds, retirement accounts etc.) 1 . Furthermore, the median age of entry into the stock market is quite high (around forty five). Although we began to see a substantial increase in stock market participation and much more sophisticated household portfolio structures over the 1990s, the observed aversion to stockholding and differences in participation patterns across households even after controlling for age, income, wealth and education still pose a great challenge to the life cycle model 2 . This paper asks whether a life cycle portfolio choice model with a one-time fixed entry cost can match the empirically observed facts regarding stock market participation.
Most studies in the literature present evidence of the presence of an entry cost without inferring its magnitude (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002 and Guiso et al 2003) . A few use simulation techniques to illustrate the potential size of the entry cost necessary to generate complete non-participation for different preference parameters (Haliassos and Bertaut 1997 , Polkovnichenko 2001 and Haliassos and Michaelides 2003 . Gomes and Michaelides(2005) show that a realistically calibrated life cycle model and a small fixed entry cost to stock market can generate observed participation rates using Epstein-Zin preferences and allowing for heterogeneity in risk aversion. None of these studies attempts to estimate entry cost within a complete structural estimation framework. This paper takes an important step forward in identifying fixed stock market entry costs by estimating a fairly rich version of the standard life cycle portfolio choice model. The key contribution of the paper is to actually estimate the structural parameters (the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the discount factor) of a dynamic model and offer an estimate of a fixed cost that can rationalize 1 Sweden has the highest indirect stock holding (54% in 1999) followed by the U.S. (48% in 1998) See Guiso et al (2003) . According to the most recent SCF (2001) , the indirect stock market participation in the US has gone up to 51% (see Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) ). 2 For instance in 1998 only 19% of the American households were holding equity directly in publicly traded corporations. This number is the highest (27%) for the UK among all developed nations. See Bertaut (1998) and Guiso et al (2003) . stock market participation patterns 3 .
Costs that deter entry into the stock market may take several forms. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) categorizes participation costs as fixed entry costs, fixed and variable transaction costs and per period trading costs. She points to strong structural (state) dependence in participation and stock holding decisions as evidence of fixed entry and transaction costs, but does not estimate those costs 4 . Structural dependence in participation manifests itself by making participation in a given period more likely if the household participated in the previous period. Using panel data on household indirect stockholding she finds that lagged participation is a very significant determinant of current participation. Another related study by Guiso et al (2003) presents cross-country evidence on the presence of participation costs. On the basis of detailed descriptive work, they conclude that the crosscountry differences in participation rates can be better explained by different institutional and informational barriers to entry across countries than by differences in stock returns.
The entry cost considered in this paper is a one time cost a first time investor must incur to participate in the stock market and it has a very broad definition. It can be thought of, in part, as the value of time spent to understand the basic functioning of stock markets, to learn how to follow price movements, how to trade, how to assess risk and return relationship for an optimal portfolio choice, etc. Since I think of this as a time cost incurred to acquire information, and hence related to the opportunity cost of time (the wage), it is plausible to formulate this cost as proportional to the permanent component of labor income 5 . It is important to note that this cost is paid (if ever paid) only once over the entire life cycle.
Once it is paid, the household is free to re-enter the stock market (if exited some time after 3 To my knowledge, Faria (2000) is the only study that estimates a fixed entry cost. However, he uses an infinite life general equilibrium model with no equity or labor income risk. His results are extremely sensitive to the equity premium assumed. 4 She does estimate per period trading costs. Participation costs that do not create structural state dependence (such as per period trading costs) can be inferred within a reduced form setting. Costs, on the other hand, that create correlation of participation or stock holding decisions across periods (entry costs, fixed and variable transaction costs) can only be identified with structural estimation. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) concludes that a per period transaction cost of as low as $50 can explain the choices of half of nonparticipants. Paiela (2001) estimates per period cost bounds in terms of forgone utility gains and finds that at least $31 is needed to generate the observed participation pattern for a consumer with log utility. 5 This assumption turns out to be necessary in order to make our estimation strategy feasible. With this simplifying but justifiable assumption, the number of state variables is reduced. entry) without incurring any further cost; once learned, such knowledge is not forgotten for the rest of the life cycle 6 . In my empirical work below, I provide some evidence on the plausibility of this assumption.
The estimation involves matching the age-profile (corrected for cohort effects and family size) and structural dependence in participation observed in the U. S. Panel Data of Income Dynamics (PSID) with their simulated counterparts. To do so, I use a Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD) estimator. I match some carefully selected auxiliary statistics (parameters of an auxiliary model). Using a probit regression as my auxiliary model, I estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion and subjective discount rate to be 1.625 and 0.0874 respectively. The stock market entry cost is estimated to be 2.15 percent of the permanent component of annual labor income. These findings are in line with the findings of calibration studies that use the Survey of Consumer Finances and match different moments (Haliassos and Michaelides 2003 , Cocco 2005 and Gomes and Michaelides 2005 . All parameters are estimated with considerable precision. Although the overidentification restrictions are rejected, the estimates of the intertemporal allocation parameters are within the range of previous estimates in the literature. Moreover, the simulated participation profiles (based on the estimated parameters) seem to be in line with the actual profiles, and the estimated model matches the structural dependence in the data.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I lay out a structural life-cycle model of portfolio choice. I also numerically solve and simulate the model at some illustrative parameter values, in order to demonstrate the potential effects of a stock market entry cost. I then turn to the structural estimation of the model. Data and the estimation method are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents my results. Section 5 concludes. 6 In the standard life cycle setting the only reason to exit the stock market is to finance consumption. A buffer stock saver may have to liquidiate his shares if he gets hit by an adverse income shock that leaves him with insufficient cash on hand to afford his optimal consumption.
2 The Model 2.1 A Basic Life-Cycle Model of Portfolio Choice with Entry Cost I assume that the expected utility function is intertemporally additive over a finite life time and the sub-utilities are iso-elastic. The problem of the generic consumer is
where C is non-durable consumption (separable from durable consumption), γ is coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ is rate of time preference. I assume that the end of working life T is certain 7 . Following Deaton (1991) , I define the endogenous state variable cash on hand as the sum of financial assets and labor income and it evolves as follows:
where r e t+1 is stochastic return from the risky asset representing the stock market, r is the risk-free rate which can be thought of as bonds, T-bills and bank accounts, S t is the amount of wealth invested in the risky asset, B t is the amount of wealth invested in the risk-free asset. Following Carroll (1992) Y t+1 is labor income which follows the exogenous stochastic process:
Current income Y t is composed of a permanent component, P t ,and transitory shocks, U t .
The permanent component of labour income grows at the rate G t is subject to multiplicative iid shocks, N t .
7 It would be straight forward to incorporate a stochastic mortality into the model. This additional complexity though is not likely to contribute significantly to the estimation results. This argument is especially stronger considering I am interestred only in working life at this point.
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002) I define a retirement value function so that the consumption rule at the time of retirement is
where λ 1 is marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and H T +1 is exogenously accumulated illiquid wealth, which is modelled as proportional to the permanent component of labor income at the time of the retirement (hP T ). This assumption leads to positive wealth at the time of retirement. I do not consider retirement years or explicitly model a bequest motive.
The excess return on the risky asset is assumed to be iid:
where μ is the mean excess return and ε t+1 is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ 2 ε . A positive correlation between return and shocks to the permanent component of labor income along with short sale constraints also generates delayed entry since such a correlation leads to a hedging demand for the riskless asset. However, the empirical evidence for such a correlation is rather weak. Heaton and Lucas (2000a) find a positive significant correlation between stock returns and intrapreneurial income (around 0.2) but small and insignificant values for other occupation groups. Estimates obtained by Davis and Willen (2000) range between 0.1 to 0.3 for a college educated group and significantly negative for a lower education group. Since such a correlation is not strongly evident in the data I choose to set it to zero, both in my illustrative simulations and in my estimation procedure.
The maximization problem involves using the Bellman equation and solving the recursive equation via backward induction. The problem is:
subject to short sale and borrowing constraints,
where V t (.) denotes the value function.
In order to make the estimation computationally feasible I normalize the necessary variables by dividing them by the permanent component of income (see Carroll 1992) . By doing this, I reduce the number of endogenous state variables to one, namely, ratio of cash on hand to permanent component of income. The resulting Bellman equation after normalizing is as follows:
where
Normalized consumption at the final period is:
where λ 0 = hλ 1 . Now assume that participating in the stock market requires an entry fee, whereas investing in the risk-free asset is costless. When augmented with the fixed entry cost, the solution of the above model requires additional computations. The optimizing agent now has to decide whether to enter into stock market or not before he decides how to allocate his wealth. This is done by comparing the discounted expected future value of participation and that of nonparticipation in every period. This results in the following optimization problems:
subject to
where I t is a binary variable representing participation at time t. V 0 (x t , I t ) is the value the consumer gets by not participating regardless of whether he has participated in the previous period or not, i.e. exit from the stock market is assumed to be costless.
V 1 (x t , I t ) is the value consumer gets by participating. The entry cost is proportional to the permanent component of income (P t E c ). The parameter E c is fixed and it is 0 if the agent has already participated in the stock market and it is positive if he has never participated before. Note that, like exit, re-entry is costless.
The entry cost is modeled as a "fixed "percentage of the permanent component of labor income. Remember that it is thought of as, at least in part, the time cost incurred to acquire information, and hence related to the opportunity cost of time (the wage). Given the empirically established humped shape of labor income, total entry cost incurred depends on the age of entry; 2% of the permanent component of income at the age of 55 is likely to be much higher than 2% of the permanent component of income at the age of 25.
At each time period, given his current participation state, the agent first decides whether to enter the stock market or not (or stay if he is already in) by comparing the expected discounted value of each decision. Then, conditional on participation, he decides how much wealth to allocate to the risky asset. If he chooses not to participate, the only saving instrument is the risk-free asset which has a constant return r. The details of the solution method are given in Appendix A.
Illustrative Simulations
To illustrate the potential effects of a fixed stock market entry cost on consumption, For the purpose of the simulations, I assume that the growth rate of income is nonstochastic and G = 1 8 . I also assume that the transitory shocks U t are distributed independently and identically, such that ln(U t ) ∼ N(−0.5σ 2 u , σ 2 u ). Similarly, permanent shocks N t are iid and ln(N t ) ∼ N (−0.5σ 2 n , σ 2 n ). Assuming that the innovations to income are independent over time and across individuals I assume away aggregate shocks to income. However, aggregate shocks are not completely eliminated from the model since all agents face the same return process. Initial wealth is set to zero. The retirement value function parameters λ 0 and λ 1 are set to be 0.0015 and 0.071 respectively, implying a very small ratio of illiquid wealth to the permanent component of income at retirement (
The left hand panels 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 1 display the policy functions for consumption, stock and bond holding respectively with and without entry cost in period T − 1 9 . Since the difference is hard to see by directly looking at the policy functions, I also plot the difference for each policy rule. The figures in the right hand panels 1A, 2A and 3A are obtained by simply subtracting policy functions for the model with an entry cost from those for a model without an entry cost. In the right hand panels, the dashed line represents zero so that the difference (whether positive or negative) can be seen.
The first panel presents the two consumption functions when borrowing is not allowed (they are almost on top of each other). At the low cash on hand levels the optimal consumption exceeds total available resources therefore it is forced to equal cash on hand. The facts that the consumer cannot borrow at any rate and that labor income distribution is bounded away from zero results in a Deaton-type kinked consumption function. The consumption function is simply a 45 degree line at low levels of cash on hand since the consumer is not able to save at all. This is true regardless of the entry cost; the difference between two policy functions (with and without entry cost) is exactly zero at those levels. When there is no cost to stock market entry saving means investing predominantly in stocks due to high equity premium. When the consumer is faced with an entry cost he will put all his savings to bonds until he reaches the level of wealth where he can afford to participate in the stock market. The dip under the dashed zero line in Panel 1A corresponds to the cash-on hand levels where the consumer (when facing an entry cost) is still out of the stock market as he cannot afford to pay the entry cost but saves in the form of bonds. In the absence of entry cost optimal consumption is much lower (than it is in the presence of it) around the target wealth level due to aggressive stock market investment to take advantage of high equity premium and enjoy higher consumption later in the life cycle.
The panels 2 and 2A show the effect of entry cost on optimal stock holding. The optimal stock holding is zero where the cash on hand is less than the optimal consumption regardless of entry cost. The difference in the optimal stock holding becomes large where saving takes place but stock market entry cannot be afforded yet. The spike in the Panel 2A corresponds to this situation. Not surprisingly, policy functions and optimal holding difference for bond holding are qualitatively the reverse of that for stock holding (panels 3 and 3A) 10 . 10 An alternative way to introduce a borrowing constraint would be to assume zero-income risk as motivated by Carroll (1992) and adapted by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) . This assumption has important implications for optimal behavior. Given the fact that iso-elastic utility function yields infinite marginal utility of consumption at zero consumption, backward induction dictates that a consumer who faces such a risk optimally chooses never to borrow. Thus, consumer saves at every level of wealth leading to smooth policy functions and much higher diversification especially at older ages. The main message regarding the effect of an entry cost on participation would not change. See the working paper version of this paper for illustrations.
The implications of an entry cost for consumption and saving can be illustrated more clearly by comparing the life cycle paths of consumption, bond holding, stock holding and stock market participation. Figure 2 displays the life cycle paths with and without an entry cost for 40 periods. Using the policy functions and random income and return draws, 10, 000 ex-ante identical paths are generated with and without an entry cost. The figures are based on cross-section averages.
The positive consumption growth we observe in Panel 1 Figure 2 for both models is mainly due to binding borrowing constraints. The fact that it is higher under zero entry cost is because at young ages, consumers are able to invest in the stock market. This is not possible when they face an entry cost, at least until they accumulate enough wealth.
Consumption growth is unambiguously higher under zero entry cost. As wealth is accumulated, higher consumption is enjoyed over the life cycle. Note that given the parameter values (implying buffer stock behavior) consumers never accumulate much wealth and the consumption path displays a slight hump.
Wealth accumulation is predominantly in the form of stocks, especially for the zero entry cost case. Here, we see a complete portfolio specialization where a small saver bets aggressively in the stock market due to the high equity premium and the fact that labor income acts as a risk-free bond. Not surprisingly, the stock holding path in the presence of entry cost lies under that of no entry cost over the life cycle (Panel 2). This fact translates into basically, zero bond holding all along the life cycle in the case of no entry cost but a slightly higher bond holding path in the presence of an entry cost. Note that, upon entry, we still face the problem of complete portfolio specialization due to the structure and parameterization of the problem. Positive mean bond holding at every age instead of only at young ages is due to that fact that first time entry takes place at different ages for different consumers depending on their income draws.
The last panel of Figure 2 shows the life cycle path of participation with and without entry cost. It is obvious that the standard model without an entry cost has no hope of matching the participation pattern observed in the data since the model predicts very high participation at every stage of the life cycle even with the parameters that imply very little wealth accumulation. The implied mean participation is much higher than those observed in the data. Specifically, the model without entry cost implies 80 − 90% participation rate at all ages while the model augmented with only a 1 percent entry cost implies a concave participation profile with about 30 percent mean participation rate at prime ages.
While the reason for the low participation at young ages is clear (simply, affordability of stock market entry), the decline in participation after prime ages is less obvious. The explanation lies, again, in the parameterization of the model. Specifically, this model implies buffer stock behavior where very little wealth is accumulated over the life cycle. Moreover, this very little wealth is mostly in the form of stocks for many of the consumers. Therefore wealth decummulation after the prime ages (remember that the ratio of illiquid wealth to the permanent component of income at retirement is very close to zero) largely means liquidating stocks, i.e. getting out of the stock market leading to declining mean participation path.
I now turn to the structural estimation of the model.
Estimation
I employ a simulation based estimation technique. Hall and Rust (1999) refer to the general technique as Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD) since it is based on matching (minimizing the distance between) statistics from the data with statistics from a simulated model. The class of SMD estimators includes the EMM procedure of Gallant and Tauchen (1996) and the Indirect Inference methods of Gouriéroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) . Details of the estimation method are given in the appendix.
Data
The proposed estimation procedure necessitates the use of panel data on portfolio composition. For this reason, I use the PSID wealth supplements conducted in 1984 and 1989 11 .
Unfortunately, the supplements do not contain the information on direct stock holding.
i.e., participation in the stock market in the PSID refers to whether the household owns any shares of stock in publicly or privately traded corporations including the ones held in mutual funds, investment trusts and/or IRAs. Possible implications of this shortcoming are discussed in the results section. To make the sample more representative of the US population, the original poverty sample and the Latino sample are excluded (these groups were oversampled). Nevertheless, the sample I use for estimation is not fully representative of the US population since in creating a two-period balanced panel I exclude split-off families.
The estimation sample includes only households that reported all necessary demographic information (family size, race, age, and marital status) as well as their portfolio choices for both years. Female headed households and black households are excluded. Because I do not explicitly model retirement years, a bequest motive or educational choices, I take only households whose heads were older than 24 in 1984 and younger than 60 in 1989. Students and retirees are also excluded. The final sample has 1294 households. Participation statistics for the full and final (estimation) samples are presented in Table 2 . More general facts regarding household portfolios in the U.S. are well documented by a number of researchers including Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Guiso et al (2003) .
First Stage Estimation
Because the estimation method requires simulating data from the underlying structural model and since the structural model I use is rather time consuming to solve, I focus on estimating only the entry cost and intertemporal allocation parameters. Other parameters used in the second stage estimation are separately estimated/calibrated in the first stage.
Income process parameters required to implement my estimation procedure are the average age-income growth profile, and the variances of the permanent and transitory components of labor income. To estimate these parameters I follow Carroll and Samwick (1997) .
I estimate income process parameters for the sample period covering 1981-1992 (12 years).
Income data in the PSID refers to previous year's income. I define non-financial income broadly enough to account for possible insurance schemes available to households, such as unemployment insurance and social assistance. Total household nonfinancial income is total labor income plus unemployment insurance, workers compensation, social security, supplemental social security, child support, the value of food stamps and some other transfers.
Real income data are calculated using the Consumer Price Index. Following Carroll and Samwick (1997) I assume an income process that can be decomposed into permanent and transitory components as described in the model section. The logarithm of the permanent component of income (p i t ) for each household follows random walk with drift:
where g i t is the growth rate of the permanent component of income (likely to be a function of individual characteristics and demographics) and n i t is mean zero iid shocks with variance
Then, the logarithm of current income y i t evolves as:
where the u i t are mean zero iid transitory shocks with variance σ 2 u .
First, I estimate the average age-income growth profile by simply regressing income growth on occupation, industry dummies, age, age-squared, age cubed, race, marital status, and family size. Estimated average age-income growth profiles are obtained by taking the predicted values from this regression and calculating age-specific averages. Predictable income growth has important implications for household portfolio composition. If an individual expects high income growth, depending on the other parameters of his utility function, he may want to borrow against his future income when young if he is not facing borrowing constraints. In my setting, borrowing against future labor income is not allowed.
Second, I estimate the error structure of the income process described above. For this, first, I regress the logarithm of real income on age dummies, marital status, family size and race. Then I construct differenced regression residuals. I define (following the notation and the procedure of Carroll and Samwick 1997)
where ε t is the residuals obtained from the log real income regression. Assuming a constant growth rate
I combine all possible series of V ar(r d ) and d and regress V ar(r d ) on a constant and d. The results are presented in Table 3 Years were chosen so that the oldest household head in 1984 data (56 years of age) was at the age of 22 in 1950. The mean equity premium calculated is 6% with the standard deviation of 17%. The model is solved using these two empirical moments of the return distribution. In order to generate simulated paths I use realized returns. The risk-free rate is calculated by taking the mean of the real annual 3-month T-Bill rate (3%). Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , the retirement value function parameters λ 0 and λ 1 are set to be 0.0015 and 0.071 respectively implying the ratio of illiquid wealth to the permanent component of income at retirement to be (
A discussion regarding the choice of these parameters and a sensitivity analysis are presented in the results section.
Initial Conditions
Because I do not observe all households at the beginning of their life cycle (24 years of age) I need to estimate an initial wealth distribution to initiate simulations. For this, I use a sample of households whose head is between 24 and 28 years of age and fit a lognormal distribution to the empirical distribution of the ratio of wealth to the permanent component of income.
Wealth is the sum of financial and real assets and the permanent component of income is the The model presented in the previous section assumes that the stock market entry cost is paid, at most, once over the life-cycle: stock market re-entry is costless. Moreover, if the entry cost is a one time cost, it is most natural to think of it as an information cost, which in turn makes modelling it as proportional to the permanent component of permanent income attractive (because the opportunity cost of information acquisition depends on the wage.)
Fortunately, I can perform a simple empirical test to asses the plausibility of costless reentry. It is now possible to observe the portfolios of the PSID households in 3 different time periods (1984,1989 and 1994) . Participation in 1989 is a good predictor of participation in 1994 (this is the structural dependence reported in the literature.) However, if the entry cost is a one time cost, then participation in 1989 should have no effect on participation in 1994 among those households that participated in 1984. Empirically, this turns out to be the case. 13
Choice of Auxiliary Parameters
In general, the number of potential auxiliary statistics can be larger than the model parameters in which case the estimation procedure provides an opportunity to test the overidentifying restrictions. Naturally, the use of the correct weighting matrix becomes relevant if one proceeds with this strategy. However, the monte carlo experiments performed by Alvarez et al (2003) suggest that SMD estimators do not perform well in environments with large numbers of overidentifying restrictions.
I use a simple auxiliary model to generate auxiliary statistics. In particular, I construct an age-participation profile based on the following empirical model.
where I t denotes participation status, F S t denotes family size in period t. I use nine cohort dummies (middle cohort is omitted). The auxiliary statistics I chose to match are the constant and the coefficients on age, age-squared, and lagged participation. The model is estimated using a linear probability model and a probit model. 14 The above empirical specification imposes three identification restrictions: first it assumes that the age effects can be captured by a second degree polynomial. Second, ageparticipation profiles across cohorts are parallel to each other and finally, there are no time effects on stock market participation. Clearly, one can proceed with different identification restrictions that may lead to quite different reduced form estimates and consequently, differ-14 Note that the auxiliary regression does not include all the conventional right hand side variables used in the empirical literature (particularly, income and wealth). In fact, one can condition on these variables (and more) in the auxiliary model and match the (partial) derivatives of participation with respect to age, lagged participation, and wealth and income. This would result in a higher number of overidentifying restrictions than I have in the paper. I chose to restrict the number of overidentifying restrictions because Alvarez et al. (2003) have established that Simulated Minimum Distance estimators do not perform well in environments with large numbers of overidentifying restrictions. Given that I match only the derivatives of participation with respect to age and lagged participation, I could still include wealth and income in the auxiliary model and then match partial derivatives (that is, derivatives holding wealth and income constant). However, I do not include wealth and income in the auxiliary model, so that I am matching "total" derivatives with respect to age and lagged participation (note that income and wealth are positively correlated with age.) In general, for consistency, it does not matter which auxiliary statistics I use as long as I treat the actual and simulated data in exactly the same way. In matching "total" derivatives, I am somewhat following the empirical framework of Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) . ent structural estimates (see Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) ). I chose this specification because it connects my auxiliary statistics to the existing reduced form literature and it generates only 1 overidentifying restriction (whereas if I matched the entire age-profile, I would have many over-identifying restrictions).
When constructing age-participation profiles it is particularly important to adjust for cohort effects for two reasons. First, different cohorts may have different participation attitudes and this will not be represented in the simulated data. For example if the earlier cohorts did not know much about the stock market or if they had a particular dislike for risky investments, the estimated age-participation profile will have a spurious decline at older ages. Second, earlier cohorts may have had lower initial wealth and, consequently, lower stock market participation rate. This may also cause a bias in the estimated profiles by, again, pushing the profiles down at older ages.
After estimating the equation above I take the coefficients α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , α 3 as auxiliary parameters. Since the focus of this paper is to estimate the entry cost, the choice of the auxiliary parameter that identifies it deserves a particular attention. It is now well known that the presence of a fixed entry cost leads to structural dependence in participation decision. Hence, a significant coefficient on past participation (α 3 ) seems to be a natural choice to identify the entry cost. If the entry cost were zero, participation in any given period would be independent of participation in the previous period and this coefficient would be statistically not different from zero. I performed a simulation check to establish the relationship between this coefficient and the structural entry cost parameter and found a strong monotone relationship over a wide range of entry cost values.
A possible concern here is that the structural dependence in the data is the spurious result of unobserved heterogeneity. 15 I require a method to deal with these effects in the auxiliary estimations since the same effects are not present in the simulated data. For dynamic panel data models Heckman (1981) proposes an approximate random effect estimator to remove (or diminish) the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. This estimator can be used for T = 2 or higher and its bias is not as large as the fixed effects estimator. The estimator assumes that individual effects are not correlated with the right hand side variables other than the lagged variable. This is a plausible assumption for the auxiliary model I use in the paper since I do not include moments of labor income in the participation equation. 16 The estimation method amounts to specifying participation for both periods 1984 and 1989 separately where the equation for 1989 has 1984's participation as an additional regressor, and allowing for correlation in errors across two equations 17 .
Second Stage Estimation
The structural estimation involves a grid search over three parameters: the coefficient of risk aversion, discount rate and the entry cost. Other parameters-variances of permanent and transitory shocks, income growth, return process parameters and the risk free rate-are calibrated. Steps in the estimation procedure are as follows:
1. Obtain the necessary sample auxiliary parameters from the data: These are the first four coefficients of the participation regression (equation 20).
2. Obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters through a panel data bootstrap procedure.
3. Solve the underlying structural model and simulate participation paths that imitate the data patterns (the age composition and the panel structure of the sample). Obtain simulated auxiliary parameters by estimating a participation equation on the simulated data (a probit relating current participation to age, age-squared and participation lagged five periods). 16 These variables would be very likely to be correlated with unobserved individual effects. 17 Alternatively, one could adopt a more structural approach and estimate a heterogenous model where typically, a parametric distribution is assumed for the coefficient of relative risk aversion instead of imposing a single parameter for everyone. In such a case we would estimate the moments of the assumed distribution. This approach is used in Alan and Browning (2003) for the estimation of heterogenous discount factor. Unfortunately, I cannot follow the same route in this paper since I do not have sufficiently long panel data on portfolio composition. Such estimation requires construction of auxiliary statistics for each individual in the actual data. The resulting empirical distribution of individual statistics would be used to identify the structural distribution of the parameter of interest. With 2 observations per individual, this is not possible. replicating the exact structure of the data, I address this problem. Note that the same situation can arise in the simulated data. Depending on the initial condition and income realizations, a household may: never participate; participate sometime but not be observed while participating; participate sometime and be observed participating in both years or in one of the years; or it may participate all along. It should be reemphasized that as long as the features of the real data are replicated in the simulated data SMD estimator is consistent 19 . This ability of the SMD estimator to overcome complicated sampling and selection issues in the real data simply by replicating the sampling and selection procedures on the simulated data is very attractive feature of this method.
Turning to estimation, after defining grids for all three parameters I calculate the criterion function for every point in the grid. I initially define 20 grid points for the risk aversion coefficient, 20 for the discount rate and 30 points for the entry cost. The entire procedure is repeated for every defined combination in this three dimensional grid. After narrowing down the possible parameter values I perform a finer grid search. After further narrowing down the parameter values, I define even finer grid to make the criterion function as close as possible to zero. For example, for the entry cost, I define 50 grid points after trapping the estimate between 0.015 and 0.025. After estimating the parameters, the variance covariance matrix is calculated at the estimated parameter values. It is important to note that the variance-covariance matrix is calculated using the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters so that precision of the structural estimates takes into account the precision of the auxiliary estimates. Finally, since the model is overidentified, an overidentification test is also performed.
Results
Three auxiliary regression models are estimated. The first three columns of Table 4 presents the auxiliary parameter estimates for linear probability, maximum likelihood probit and heterogeneity corrected probit models. All models display a significant concave age profile even after controlling for cohort effects and family size. Moreover, lagged participation seems to be a very significant determinant of current participation even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity suggesting a significant "true" structural dependence due to entry cost. Note that the estimated correlation coefficient across residuals for heterogeneity corrected probit is not statistically significant suggesting that heterogeneity is not a serious problem for this particular sample. For this reason, structural estimation was performed using only the parameters of the first two auxiliary models. Table 5 reports the results of the SMD estimation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the discount rate and the entry cost to permanent income ratio for the linear probability and maximum likelihood probit models. The estimates do not seem to be very different in magnitude across auxiliary models. Moreover, all structural parameters are estimated with a remarkable precision for both auxiliary models. The entry cost is estimated to be approximately 2.1% of the permanent component of income. Zero median participation is matched precisely.
Baseline Structural Estimates
The entry cost estimates are quite small compared to the values used in Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) . Remember that their work involves experimenting with different values of entry cost to generate nonparticipation. The obvious reason why I am able to generate observed participation pattern with a much smaller entry cost is that my underlying model is a finite life model where agents may not be able to accumulate enough wealth to make it worthwhile to participate in the stock market over their entire life cycle. Note on the other hand, that in an infinite life setting all agents eventually participate if the entry cost is not sufficiently high. In the finite life case, the participation decision depends also on the investment horizon. For instance, an agent who is at the age of T − 1 and who never participated before will not find it worthwhile to pay the cost and invest in the stock market for a wide range of wealth. Thus, a tiny entry cost will suffice to discourage him.
As investment horizon becomes longer, the magnitude of the cost necessary to deter entry becomes larger. At the very extreme, infinite life case, the required cost to keep all agents out of the stock market will naturally be much higher.
The estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion are 1.625 and 1.61 for probit and linear models respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant and perfectly in line with the previous estimates based on consumption data. Based on an Euler equation estimation, Attanasio et al (1999) estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be around 1.5. Among the studies which perform structural estimation, the estimates of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) range between 0.28 and 2.29, and the estimates of Alan and Browning (2003) range between 1.2 and 1.95. The discount rate estimates (0.87 and 0.86) are also reasonable and precise although somewhat higher than the estimates obtained by Alan and Browning (2003) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) . As in the studies based on consumption data, my estimated intertemporal allocation parameters suggest that the households accumulate very little wealth over their working life and they behave as buffer stock savers.
Studies based on matching wealth data find a much higher coefficient of relative risk aversion. Cagetti (2003) estimates it to be 2.74 for households with no high school degree and 4.26 for those with a college degree by matching the median wealth in the PSID. Gakidis Table 4 . Compare the first 2 columns with the last two columns). This is especially striking for the structural dependence parameter; estimation using the data yields the value 1.272 while the simulations at the estimated structural parameters result in the value 1.246. The estimated structural parameters also do a good job in matching the predicted age-participation profile observed in the data. Figure 3 depicts the simulated and actual predicted age-participation profiles for both auxiliary models. As shown in the second panel, the probit specification match is very good for the early ages. The real success of the model is that given estimated structural parameters, it is able to generate the observed humped shape age-participation profile and structural dependence in the data.
Entry cost estimates presented here may be an over estimate for two reasons. The first is related to the fact that panel data on direct stock holding are not available. Remember that the stock market participation in the PSID refers to both direct and indirect stock holding.
Households that hold stocks only indirectly may well not incur an entry cost. My model and estimation procedure assumes that all participants incur this cost, and so I effectively assume that all households that hold stocks do so directly. The key auxiliary statistic that identifies the entry cost in my procedure is the state dependence in the participation decision (the fact that participation in 89 is much higher for those who participated in 84). In my model, greater observed state dependence implies a larger entry cost. However, indirect stock holders are likely to hold in both periods (for example, by remaining with their firm/pension plan) for reasons unrelated to the entry cost. Thus, the likely consequence of assuming that all stock holding is direct is that I overestimate the entry cost.
The second issue is that the model abstracts from real asset choices by implicitly assuming that decisions regarding real assets (mainly housing) are separable from decisions regarding liquid financial assets. Housing is the single most important asset in especially young households' portfolio; it is highly illiquid, risky and it provides consumption stream which in turn makes it very hard to include in this paper. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001) show that in the presence of service providing collaterable durables (such as housing) financial asset accumulation could be delayed. It is sensible to think that young households may delay their financial wealth accumulation (especially stock market participation) in order to purchase a house. Abstracting from this would lead the stock market entry cost to be overestimated (because in the model, it is the entry cost that delays participation).
Sensitivity to Calibrated Parameters
I now turn to some sensitivity analysis. In particular, I present some estimation results based on first, a smaller transitory income variance, then retirement function parameters λ 0 and λ 1 .
The reason for checking the sensitivity of the structural estimates to the variance of the transitory component of income is the possibility that it largely represents measurement error rather than transitory shocks to income. Carroll and Samwick (1997) As it is very time consuming to re-estimate the model in the exact way the benchmark model estimated (using a very fine grid), I save some computation time for these robustness checks by using a coarser grid and searching around the benchmark values. As a result, I
do not calculate the standard errors and overidentification statistics since their calculation requires a very fine grid. The probit auxiliary model is used for both robustness exercises. Table 6 presents the structural parameter estimates. The first column presents the estimates when the variance of the transitory component of income is set to 0.01 (instead of 0.041).
The estimates are not very far from the benchmark values. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is a bit smaller than the benchmark case while the discount rate is slightly higher. The entry cost estimate is lower than the benchmark estimate and this should not come as a surprise. A lower income uncertainty is expected to lower the demand for buffer stock saving (only saving motive that is of real importance in this model) and this leads to lower wealth accumulation. Hence, the entry cost required to deter stock market entry is lower.
The second column presents the structural estimates when the illiquid wealth to permanent component of income is increased 10 times its benchmark value. The coefficient of relative risk aversion estimate is now lower (1.36) than the benchmark case (1.62) and so is the discount rate estimate (0.069 versus 0.087). Consistent with the intertemporal parameter estimates, the entry cost estimate is now a bit higher (2.3%).
Discussion of Identification
The fact that the structural parameters are estimated with a remarkable precision calls for a discussion of identification. It appears that a small change in parameter values results in considerable changes in simulated profiles and structural dependence. Table 7 presents three counterfactual experiments where each counterfactual represents a small deviation of the structural parameters from the optimum (i.e., from the actual estimates). For these experiments, I use the baseline estimates derived from the probit auxiliary model. The experiments involve computing predicted mean participation at the ages of 30 (early in the life cycle), 45 (about peak participation age) and 59 (just before retirement). The first two rows of the table present predicted mean participation and the structural dependence parameter for the actual data and at the actual structural parameter estimates respectively.
Even though the participation at early ages are well matched, the height of the predicted age profile is lower than that of the actual data: At the age of 45, estimated mean participation is .634 while the actual data suggest such value to be .754. The linear model seems to do better job in capturing the height of the age profile.
In the first experiment, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is increased from 1.625 to 1.645. A higher risk aversion coefficient is expected to push up estimated peak participation.
However, as evident in the table, such a move results in higher early participation and lower structural dependence due to fast wealth accumulation and consequently better affordability of the entry cost; mean participation at the age of 30 increased from .527 to .534 and structural dependence parameter fell from 1.246 to 1.235, both further away from the values obtained from the data.
Increasing the discount rate from .0874 to .088 resulted in values that have quite similar interpretation. Higher impatience prevents the early participation and naturally slows down the wealth accumulation leading to a flatter age-participation profile with higher structural dependence. A higher structural dependence is the obvious artifact of the low wealth accumulation and consequently a higher effective entry cost.
The final experiment is conducted by increasing entry cost from .0215 to .0225. Not surprisingly, a higher entry cost leads to a higher structural dependence parameter (from 1.246 to 1.282). Furthermore, it deters participation in early years leading to slightly lower life cycle wealth accumulation.
Conclusion
In the presence of entry costs, stockholding is concentrated at the upper end of the wealth distribution. Such costs discourage small savers by making stock holding not worthwhile for them. These are the investors for whom the entry costs exceeds the optimal value of stock investment. With an entry cost, these savers are left with only low risk-low return saving tools, such as bank accounts, money market funds and bonds. Naturally, a reduction in the entry costs would result in an increase in the number of stockholders, to whom consequently, more consumption smoothing tools are available. Such an improvement in the capital markets may very well contribute to reducing the need for some public insurance schemes that are designed to help smooth consumption such as unemployment insurance and publicly provided health insurance. For example, in a recent paper, Lentz (2003) emphasizes that the optimal unemployment insurance benefit rate in a search model with savings is quite sensitive to the rate of return on savings. A high rate of return makes it attractive to hold wealth and hence self-insurance is not as costly.
Going beyond elaborating on their symptoms, knowing the magnitude of entry costs is important whether their reduction calls for public policy or if such action should simply be left to publicly traded corporations and financial intermediaries. Matching participation rate statistics with their simulated counterparts is a challenging task. As is well known, as soon as we introduce labor income uncertainty, the solution of intertemporal model requires numerical methods. Although solution methods for these types of models are now standard, tractability can easily disappear with a seemingly small additions to the model. Adding a participation decision to the problem with two controls (risky and risk-free asset holdings), one endogenous state variable (cash on hand) and three stochastic state variables (shocks to risky asset return and shocks to permanent and transitory income) makes the numerical solution fairly complicated and time consuming. Clearly, there are several different participation costs (whether fixed or variable) that a trader incurs not only upon entry but also over the course of participation. Brokerage commissions (fixed and variable) have to be paid every time a transaction takes place. No transaction, whether it is re-balancing of a portfolio or simply exiting the stock market, is costless. Transaction costs directly affect the frequency of portfolio re-balancing leading to a structural dependence in the share of stocks in the financial portfolio. This has particularly serious implications for the optimal portfolio of a small saver who happens to be in the stock market. In the presence of transaction costs, it may not be worthwhile for him to re-balance his portfolio for a long period of time over the life cycle. In principle, it is possible to identify fixed transaction costs within the estimation framework used in this paper. Unfortunately, this additional complication makes the solution of the model even more time consuming.
Another obvious direction in which to extend this work is the simultaneous modelling of stock market participation and other aspects of intertemporal allocation behavior: portfolio shares, consumption and wealth levels. As Browning and Crossley (2001) Gourinchas and Parker's (2002) , it seems that it might be possible to reconcile both consumption profiles and stock market participation profiles with a model of the type I have presented. With respect to portfolio shares, preliminary work suggests that it will only be possible to match the age profile of portfolios shares with a model of this type if another risk (for example a depression or a calamity risk)
is added to the model. These extensions are left for future research.
A Appendix: Solution and Simulation Methods
The standard life cycle model for portfolio choice described in Section 2 is solved via backward induction by imposing an exogenous illiquid wealth accumulation function at the final period T . Simply, in the last period of working life the policy rule for normalized consumption is
In order to solve for the policy rules at T − 1 I discretize the state variable x (cash on hand to permanent income ratio) by defining an exogenous grid {x j } J j=1 j = 1...50. The control space is also discretized such that normalized stock holding is {s i } I i=1 j = 1...100
and normalized bond holding is {b j } I i=1 i = 1...100. For the estimation, the borrowing constraint is assumed to be explicit so I set the lowerbound for cash to 0.1 and upperbound to 10. Since borrowing is not allowed, the possible range for cash on hand is always positive therefore it is not necessary to adjust the grid as the solution goes back in time 20 . For the illustration of the model in Section 2, a positive zero income probability is assumed and the control space is not discretized.
The algorithm first finds the investment on risky and riskless assets that maximize the value function for each value in the grid of x. Then, another optimization is performed where the generic consumer has only risk free asset to invest. Values of both optimizations are compared and the rule that results in higher value is picked. The value function at T − 1 is the outer envelope of the two value functions. Since I use a smooth cubic spline to approximate earlier value functions, nonconvexities due to taking outer envelope of two functions do not pose any numerical difficulty.
For illustration of the model, first, I generate 10, 000 income shocks for 60 years using the income process described in Section 2. 60 years of returns are generated in the similar fashion. The probability of zero income shocks is generated using a uniform random 20 In genearal, when borrowing is allowed, cash on hand in any given period (except for the last period) can be negative. It is then crucial to adjust the grid since the possible ranges for cash on hand are different at different stages of life. For instance, if one wants to impose a borrowing constraint such that all debt must be paid before death, then possible lower bound for cash on hand at time T − 1 is minus the minimum possible income realization divided by gross risk-free rate. number generator. After generating all the necessary shocks, I simulate life cycle paths of consumption, stock and bond holding for 10, 000 agents and take cross-section averages.
For the estimations, the model is solved given the calibrated income and return processes for 37 years (ages 24 to 60). Using the resulting policy functions and the realized returns simulated data for 1294 households are generated. Age composition and the panel structure of the actual data are exactly replicated in the simulated data.
0.08 risk-free rate (r) 0.03 mean excess return on risky asset (μ) 0.06 std of risky asset (σ ε ) 0.20 std of transitory income shocks (σ u ) 0.14 std of permanent income shocks (σ n ) 0.05 Fixed entry cost ratio (E c ) 0 and 0.01 Retirement function parameters λ 0 = 0.0015, λ 1 = 0.071 Because two policy functions for all three choice variables are quantitatively quite similar for a large range of cash on hand values, differences in policy functions are also presented (right hand panels 1A, 1B and 1C). These figures are obtained by subtracting the policy function at time T −1 with an entry cost from the one without. Here, a dashed line is drawn at zero so that any point under the zero line implies that the optimal rule is smaller for the model without entry cost and visa versa. At the cash on hand levels where the liquidity constraint is binding, the differerences are all zero for all three choice variables. Note that different horizontal scales were used for the right hand panels to magnify the differences between the policy functions. Policy function differences coincide for a given level of cash on hand for bonds after the fixed cost is incurred because bond holding after this point is virtually zero in both models. Paths are generated by simulating both models (one with an entry cost and one without). For each model, first, 10,000 ex-ante identical paths are generated using two 60 by 10,000 matrices of random draws of permanent and transitory shocks and a 60 by 1 vector of common stock returns. Then average consumption, stock holding, bond holding and participation for each age are calculated. The figures present the cross-section averages for ages between 25 and 65.
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Figure 3: Actual and simulated age-participation profiles. All profiles are cross-section means. Actual profiles are predicted via estimating the auxiliary models on actual data and presented for the middle cohort and household size four. Simulated profiles are predicted by estimating the auxiliary models on simulated data generated at the estimated structural parameter values. Profiles in Panel 1 are predicted using the linear probability model and profiles in Panel 2 are predicted using the probit model.
